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(65 C.2d 393; 54 Cal.Rptr. 873. 420 P.2d 393] 
[Crim. No. 10193. In Bank. Dec. 2, 1966.] 
In re JOHN WELLINGTON JOHNSON on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Oorpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence.-
Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to review a sentence in 
excess of that permitted by law and to correct the judgment 
so that it will impose the only punishment lawful under the 
undisputed ~acts. 
[2] Poisons-megal Sale of Narcotics.-In a prosecution for Ull-
lawful sales of heroin, though the number of deliveries may 
be relevant in determining the number of crimes committed, the 
number of deliveries is not conclusive; the entire transaction 
must be considered. Where, in negotiating a sale of heroin to 
an undercover agent, one price was agreed on and defendant 
intended from the outset to sell either 10 spoons for $250 nr 
five spoons for $150, and where the heroin was delivered in 
two installments SUbstantially contemporaneous in time only 
because the agent wished to try the "stuff" before buying, only 
one crime was committed. 
[8] Oriminal Law-Punishment-Double Punishment: Poisons-
Illegal Sale of Narcotics-Punishment.-The basic principle 
that forbids multiple punishment for one criminal act pre-
cluded in:ftiction, in a narcotic prosecution, of more than one 
punishment for a series of acts directed toward one criminal 
objective, the single sale of heroin, delivered in two install-
ments, to one customer at a price agreed on at the outset. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from cus-
tody. Writ granted in part to vacate and set aside judgment 
and sentence on one count of the information; order to show 
. cause discharged and writ denied in all other respects. 
John Wellington Johnson, in pro. per., and RobertC. An-
derson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Peti-
tioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, As-
sistant Attorney General, and Harold F. Bradford, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus § 41; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus 
(1st ed § 59). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 34(5)(b); [2J Poi-
sons, § 10.1; [3] Criminal Law, § 1475; Poisons, § 16. 
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-In 1963 a jury found petitioner guilty 
of two counts of unlawfully selling heroin' (Health & Safe 
Code, § 11501) and the trial court imposed consecutive senten-
ces. In this habeas corpus proceeding petitioner contends that 
the prosecution's evidence at the trial established that the acts 
charged and 'adjudged as two separate sales were in fact and 
law parts of a single transaction constituting only one offense. 
[1] Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to review a sentence 
in excess of that permitted by law (In re Ward, 64 Ca1.2d 
672, 675 [51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 414 P.2d 400] ; In re Seeley, 29 
Ca1.2d 294 [176 P.2d 24]) and to correct the jUdgment so that 
it will impose the only punishment lawful under the undis-
puted facts. (Neal v. State of Cal'ifornia, 55 Cal.2d 11, 17 [9 
Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839].) 
The convictions of two sales of heroin rest on the following 
undispute~ facts: On November 8, 1962, Billie Robertson, an 
undercover agent for the state narcotic enforcement bureau, 
arranged to meet petitioner at a bar. They met at 9 p.m. and 
discussed a sale of heroin to Robertson for $30 a spoon (ap-
proximately two grams). Robertson said, "I'll take a spoon 
. . . and if it's good I'll take the five spoons for $30.00 a 
spoon. " Petitioner said, "I'll trust you and ... you can 
try it out·and then give me the bread [money] .... If it's no 
good you can bring the stuff back .... I'll tell you what I'll 
'do . . . I'll give you another five [and] . . . it will only cost 
you $250.00 for ten spoons." Petitioner left to "get the 
stuff. " Shortly thereafter Robertson met him and he delivered 
"five spoons" so that Robertson could "try it out." Robert-
son took the "stuff" to other narcotics agents; they tested it 
and found that it was an opiate. Robertson telephoned peti-
tioner and agreed to meet him again at 11 p.m. and pay him 
$150 for the five "spoons." Petitioner asked whether Robert-
son wanted "the other five for another $100" and Robertson 
said, "Yeah man, but I don't have the bread [money] right 
now. I'll take it if you'll trust me until tomorrow." Peti-
tioner agreed. At the 11 p.m. meeting Robertson gave peti-
tioner $150 for the five "spoons" that petitioner had already 
delivered, and petitioner delivered five more "spoons." The 
other agents, who had waited near by, then arrested petitioner. 
The agreed balance of $100, of course, was never paid. 
[2] Petitioner's course of criminal conduct during the two 
hours from 9 until 11 p.m. was a single transaction. It was 
only because the agent wished to try out some of the "stuff" 
before buying that the heroin was delivp.rp-d in two instaU-
ments instead of one. Furthermore, the two acts of delivery 
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were substantially contemporaneous in time. Although the 
number of deliveries may be relevant in determining the 
number of crimes committed, it is not conclusive. The entire 
transaction must be considered. To find that the two deliveries 
in this case constituted separate crimes, it would be necessary 
to attach independent criminal significance. to the bifurcation . 
of the delivery, a circumstance that had nothing to do with 
petitioner's culpability. Since one price was agreed upon at 
the outset and since petitioner intended from the outset to sell 
Robertson either 10 spoons for $250 or five spoons for $150, he 
intended to make but one sale. Moreover, that sale was not 
carried, out over such an extended period of time that -the 
bifurcation of delivery posed separate, independent dangers. 
Under these circumstances, no legitimate penal purpose would 
be served by interpreting section 11501 to permit the prosecu-
tor to carve this transaction into two crimes. 
[3] The basic principle that forbids multiple punishment 
. for one criminal act (see People v. Quinn, 61 Ca1.2d 551, 555 
[39 Cal.Rptr. 393, 393 P.2d 705] ; People v. Tideman, 57 Cal. 
2d 574, 585 [21 Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007]; People v. 
Logan,41 Ca1.2d 279, 290 [260 P.2d 20] ; People v. Knowles, 
35 Ca1.2d 175, 188 [217 P.2d 1]) precludes infliction of more 
than one punishment for the present series of acts directed 
toward one criminal objective, the single sale of heroin to one 
customer. (See Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Ca1.2d 11, 
18, fn. 1; People v. Roberts, 40 Cal.2d 483, 491 [254 P.2d 501] 
[possession and transportation of heroin necessarily incident 
to sale] ; People v. Nor Woods, 37 Ca1.2d 584, 586 '[233 P.2d 
897] [obtaining cash and automobile in exchange for used auto-
mobile in one transaction held but one theft]; People v. 
Twedt, 1 Cal.2d 392, 397 [35 P.2d 324] [offering for sale, 
negotiating for the sale of, and selling securities held one 
offense Under the Corporate Securities Act]; People v. Cle-
mett, 208 Cal. 142, 14;5 [280 P. 681] [possession, control, and 
operation of a still held one offense].) 
The judgment and sentence on count two of the information 
are vacated and set aside. The order to show cause is dis-
charged, and the petition for habeas corpus is in all other 
respects denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. 
